Thursday, March 9, 2023

More about octopus minds

1. Quiz feedback

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2. Recap
  1. Sentience vs. consciousness
    • sentience more basic; just experiencing
  2. Agency theory of sentience/experiencing -- once animals have agency, they can experience
    • animals are biological, have neurons
    • he's not necessarily saying "all agents are sentient"
  3. Agency means: sensation-action loops, self-other distinction, perceptual constancy
  4. The first animals with experience lived ~500 million years ago 
  5. So even simple animals today should be presumed to have experience
  6. Gradualism -- from experience to full consciousness (both in time and today)

Objections (workbook)

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3. Latecomer argument (against Godfrey-Smith's view)

Argument is discussed on Other Minds "Latecomer vs. Transformation" section

  1. Some mental states are conscious and some are unconscious. (see table above)
  2. The basis of consciousness is absent in the unconscious cases but present in the conscious cases.
  3. What's present in the conscious cases is one/some of these:
    • being able to go through a novel sequence of steps (Stanislas Dehaene)
    • having information in a global mental workspace (Bernhard Baars)
    • having metarepresentations (Rocco Gennaro)
    • having the "ventral visual stream" (David Milner and Melvyn Goodale)
  4. These capacities are all part of an advanced brain architecture and missing in early animals. THEREFORE
  5. The earliest animals only had unconscious minds and consciousness is a latecomer.

Global workplace theory -- watch first 4 minutes




From video  -- advocates of this theory
don't agree with her objection


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4. Godfrey-Smith's reply


  1. On the left side, people do have experiences. So nothing needs to be added to make it feel like something to be them. They have the basis of EXPERIENCE. 
  2. On the right side, people have experience PLUS consciousness.  Sophisticated architecture may be needed for consciousness.
  3. Experience already feels like something--as evidenced by intrusions
p. 14 in PDF
intrusions


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5. From experience to consciousness


p. 15 in PDF
what does it feel like to have
experience but no consciousness?

Consciousness
  1. May involve global workspace, ability to run through a novel sequences of steps, etc
  2. Also involves greater integration (below)
  3. Also involves "a more definite sense of self." (PDF p. 16)
Who is conscious?
  • How can you tell if another human being has mental states in their global workspace?
  • How can you tell if your dog or cat does?
  • What about a very different animal, like an octopus?

WATCH: My Octopus Teacher (Netflix)




27 - 33 (stop at "it can become an obsession")
58:55 - 1:08 (stop at "it's pretty incredible")
  • Is the octopus going through a novel sequence of steps?
  • Does it look as if the octopus has a "global workspace"?
  • What would that look like?
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6. Integration

Integration--one unified mind unifying it's experiences and using different sorts of information

Unity -- you see things as having shapes and colors
Disunity-- you see shapes, you see colors 

Unity--you control your legs
Disunity--your legs control your legs (

Unity--if it gets cold enough, you'll leave the theater, but it depends how much you like the movie
Disunity--you hate the cold in the movie theater but you like the movie (can't resolve)


The disunity of the octopus

  1. Octopus -- anatomy -- semi-independent legs and eyes -- video here
  2. Split brain patients -- two sides can have different information
  3. Normal humans -- 
    • unconscious parts of mind operate independently of "you"
    • you can't stop yourself from understanding this sentence: THE CAT IS ON THE MAT
    • much of the brain is not "you"--it makes you fall asleep when you don't want to
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7. Gradualism and ethics




Should concern increase gradually, based on
how much experience, how conscious, how integrated?




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