HOT Theory

 Agenda

1. Changes at Canvas
2. The theory approach to determining which species are conscious
3. Representational theory of consciousness
4. What the representational theory says about animals
5. The "absent consciousness" problem
6. HOT theory of consciousness
7. HOT theory and animals
8. Gennaro's version of the HOT theory
9. How Gennaro tries to avoid animal exclusion
10. Preview: pain week

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1. Changes etc.

• quiz, discussion
• how to use this blog
• don't stop taking notes!
• readings--how difficult?
• other topics you want to cover?

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2. The theory approach to determining which species are conscious

THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS --> WHICH ANIMALS ARE CONSCIOUS

Alternatives: 

1. The epistemic approach
2. The biological approach

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3. Representational theory of consciousness

Representational theory (Dretske)--to consciously perceive a sound, smell, color, etc. is to have a representation in your head that represents the sound, smell, color, etc., in the world. 

How is this illuminating?

1. Solves the "where's the green?" problem (the green is in the world)
2. Something more mysterious (consciousness) explained in terms of something less mysterious (representation)

What needs to be added?

1. What is representation? 
2. What is the difference between believing the wall is green and experiencing the wall as green?
3. How to avoid ubiquity--thermostats & speedometers are conscious
• possible solution: to be conscious the representation must be poised to influence beliefs, desires, and behaviors
• Michael Tye: Poised Abstract Non-conceptual Intentional Content

Preview: next week we'll ask whether the Representational Theory encompasses all forms of consciousness including pain.

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4. What the representational theory says about animals

REPRESENTATIONAL THEORY--> MOST ANIMALS ARE CONSCIOUS

Inside the Animal Mind 3: 13:09 - 16:20

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5. The "absent consciousness" problem 

Cases where...

1. Clearly someone does have the capacity for consciousness, and
2. They have representations of X that are poised to affect beliefs, desires, and behavior
3. So they should be conscious of X, according to the representational theory
4. But they are not conscious of X

Inside the Animal Mind 3: 7:48 - 10:46

1. Distracted driving
2. Blind sight

Option #1: somehow defend the Representational Theory in the face of these cases

Option #2: modify the theory

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6. Higher order thought (HOT) account of consciousness

This is a modification of the Representational Theory, not a whole new theory

Consciousness requires

1. First order representations (FORs)--representation of the car in front of you
2. Higher order representations (HORs)--representation of the representation of the car in front of you--this is called "metacognition"--HOTS are higher order thoughts

Test out whether you find this theory at all promising

1. Distracted driving
2. Blind sight

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7. HOT theory and animals

HOT THEORY --> CONSCIOUSNESS RARE TO NON-EXISTENT IN ANIMALS

Some HOT theorists welcome this implication (e.g. Peter Carruthers in The Animals Issue)

But some see animal exclusion as a problem to be overcome (e.g. Rocco Gennaro)

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8. Gennaro's version of the HOT theory 

Rocco Gennaro, "Animal Consciousness and Higher Order Thoughts"

No HOT, no consciousness

HOT represents R
HOT content: "I am seeing a car"
This makes R conscious

HOT1 represents R: "I am seeing a car"
HOT2 represents HOT1: "I am aware that I am seeing a car"
This makes HOT 1 and R conscious

Gennaro, live (32:09 - 

Gennaro article

Gennaro at IEP

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9. How Gennaro tries to avoid animal exclusion

He argues

1. Animals have consciousness, not introspection (HOT1, not HOT2)
2. Many species do have the self-concepts involved in HOT1 --a dog can think "I am seeing a cat"
3. Animal brains are capable of HOTs despite having a smaller "pre-frontal cortex" than human brains

Self-concepts in animals? (I-thoughts like "I am seeing a cat")

1. Is self-awareness uniquely human (a common idea)
2. Gennaro is denying this
3. Observation (not in Gennaro) --animals seem to constantly monitor--is this good or bad for me? This gives them some I-thoughts?
   
   

   

   "I can't get out. This is really bad."
   "I see a squirrel out there"

   
   

   
   
4. Gennaro offers "episodic memory" in animals as evidence of self-awareness 

Types of memory

1. Episodic memory--remembering yourself doing something (e.g. remembering yourself at high school graduation)
2. Semantic memory--remembering facts (e.g. the bee remembering facts about nectar location)
3. Procedural memory--remembering how to ride a bike or play an instrument

Episodic memory (involves self-awareness) in animals --->

Self-awareness in animals -->

HOTs in animals -->

Consciousness in animals

Will explore all of this March 28 and 31

Size of PFC

• More important for introspection
• HOTs possible outside the PFC

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10. Preview: pain week

1. Tuesday--what the representational theory and HOT theories say about pain; epistemic approach (Andrews), pain in fish, problem of other minds, possible human-animal differences
2. Thursday--Adam Shriver, theory of pain, a bit on the ethics of pain--quiz on Shriver (here's a sample quiz on the Gennaro article)